

Graduate Center Dissertation Fellowship Competition 2017-18 Award Year

DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP APPLICATION COVER SHEET

Name:

Antonella Mallozzi

Banner ID number:

000112366

Doctoral Program:

PHILOSOPHY

Title of Proposal:

Understanding Knowledge of Possibility and Necessity

Name of Dissertation Adviser who will write a letter of recommendation:

David Papineau

Names of Dissertation Committee members:

David Papineau, Michael Devitt, Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers University)

Abstract

The project aims to explain knowledge of possibility and necessity, i.e., modal knowledge concerning non-actual facts. In my account, modal knowledge is the product of two factors. First, *scientific investigation* provides information about the actual world, which is largely the result of empirical observation. Second, an inferential, non-empirical *bridge-principle* is needed to connect the actual to the non-actual, as experience seems to only give us knowledge of what is actual. Developing previous work by Kripke, I hold that this principle hinges on the identification of *essential properties*: ‘If E_x , then necessarily E_x ’ (‘If a certain kind/individual x has an essential explanatory property E , then necessarily all instances of x possess E ’.) Furthermore, I hold that essential properties have distinctive *explanatory power*: a thing’s essential properties explain many other properties of that thing. Importantly, we investigate essential properties empirically on a scientific basis, which respects a naturalistic approach to modal inquiry.

Project Description

We often have a strong sense that things might have been different. We might regret having done something and wish we made a different choice, or perhaps feel relieved realizing that we might have just avoided a dangerous or uncomfortable situation. Such intuitions do not involve just our personal lives. Think of nature. Although ravens are black and flamingos are pink, it seems that it might have been the other way around; or that they all might have been, say, green. Or, to take an actual global problem, there is overwhelming scientific evidence that the earth might not have been warming and ice might not have been melting during the last few decades, had humans not acted so carelessly with the environment with their gas emissions. These are all judgements involving counterfactual, unrealized *possibilities*. Conversely, we often have strong intuitions that things might *not* have been different. That regardless of the specific circumstances, certain facts or events could not have possibly been otherwise. Given that the chemical composition of water is H_2O , water could not have been a different molecular compound. Regardless of how, or even whether, human beings used arithmetic or algebraic calculation, the principles and laws of arithmetic and algebra could not have possibly been different. These are all judgments involving actual *necessities*. *Modal* judgements (as well as

beliefs, intuitions, and so on) concern what is *possible* and what is *necessary*. Some modal judgements seem especially natural and compelling to us; others derive from careful reflection. But, assuming that we are reliable at judging these matters, on what basis do we do so? Experience is only of what is actual. So *how do we know about necessities and non-actual possibilities?* This is what I call the *central question* for the philosophy of modality; particularly, for that branch of the theory of knowledge that focuses on modality—i.e., *modal epistemology*.

Modal reasoning has a crucial role in our lives for evaluating possible lines of action and guiding future choices; similarly in standard scientific practice, where modal reasoning guides the formulation of hypotheses and prediction-making. In philosophy, modality is central. Philosophical arguments aim to establish possible and necessary conclusions; and the study of modality from the different angles of metaphysics, logic, and epistemology has had a central place in the discipline throughout history, in both the Western and the Eastern tradition. In my dissertation, I propose an account of modal knowledge that aims to answer the central question of *how* we know about modal matters.

I should clarify the subject of my research. There are many kinds of modality, depending on which properties and laws we are considering. *Physical* modality concerns possibility and necessity given the laws of physics. It is a physical possibility that I might have been in Rome rather than in New York today; though it is a physical necessity that I can't just teleport myself from New York to Rome. *Logical* modality, instead, concerns possibility and necessity given the laws of (classical) logic. It is a logical possibility that I could teleport myself from Rome to New York; though it is a logical necessity that I can't both be in Rome and not in Rome simultaneously. Furthermore, philosophers speak of *metaphysical* modality. Roughly, this concerns the nature and identity of things in the most general sense. Thus, metaphysical modality usually is not restricted to the actual laws of nature, but it captures possibilities and necessities

given slightly or even radically different *physical* laws. Still, metaphysical possibility is usually taken to be constrained by *logical* necessity. Thus, it seems to be metaphysically possible that my parents may still have met in Rome even if the acceleration of gravity had been 19.6 m/s^2 ; though it is metaphysically necessary that I was born from my own parents; and it is *a fortiori* metaphysically impossible (given that it is logically impossible) that my parents both met and never met. Finally, I shall mention *epistemic* modality. This concerns what is possible and necessary given the amount of information that a subject has in a certain context. Given what the ancient Greeks knew, it was an open possibility that the structure of water could be other than H_2O ; though it was epistemically necessary that water is the clear, drinkable liquid in rivers and lakes. In my dissertation, I address mostly *metaphysical* modality, though the other kinds of modality also play an important role. In chapter 1, I argue that some physical laws are metaphysically necessary; in chapter 2, I discuss the distinction between epistemic vs. metaphysical modality.

The central thesis of my account is that our knowledge of metaphysical modality is, in most cases, the joint product of both *a posteriori* and *a priori* factors. These expressions denote the epistemic or cognitive method by which we gain certain information. Roughly, '*a posteriori*' denotes something we know based on empirical experience (e.g., by means of our senses, or through someone's testimony); whereas '*a priori*' denotes something we know independently of experience (i.e., by means of pure reasoning or intuition). In my account, I identify the *a posteriori* factors contributing to modal knowledge with the results of scientific investigation, i.e., the information we have concerning the fundamental laws and properties of nature. On the other hand, I identify the *a priori* factors contributing to modal knowledge with certain basic principles of modal inference, i.e., basic logical principles that govern correct modal reasoning. Thus, my main thesis is that, although empirically informed by scientific investigation, modal

inquiry also proceeds by means of *a priori* justified fundamental principles.

In this sense my approach is hybrid between the two main traditions on this issue. On the one hand, I distance myself from purely *rationalist* approaches that have dominated the field for the past twenty years or so. These approaches appeal to strictly *a priori* methods/sources of justification, like *conceivability* (Chalmers: 2002), *intuitions* (BonJour: 1998), and *conceptual knowledge* (Peacocke: 1999). On the other hand, I am also critical of more recent *empiricist* attempts of downplaying or eliminating the role of the *a priori* for modal knowledge (Williamson: 2007; Leon & Fischer: forthcoming) My hope is to offer an account that preserves the best of both approaches, combining them into a *moderate* account.

Moreover, my account proposes an *explanation* of modal facts themselves. Such explanation resorts to the notion of *essence* or *essential property*. This is another crucial point in my project. The notion of essence denotes, roughly, a property or set of properties that an object has necessarily or cannot fail to have if it is to be the kind of thing it is (e.g., the essence of gold is atomic number 79). This notion has long dominated the philosophical discussion starting with Aristotle, and continued historically with the work of the Scholastic and later modern European philosophers—most importantly Descartes and Locke. Although the notion fell into discredit during the 20th century mostly due to the criticisms of Quine, it has been more recently revived, especially thanks to the work of Kripke in the 1970s. The ideas in my project owe a lot to Kripke's work. (Incidentally, Professor Kripke teaches here at the Graduate Center. We have a permanent archive and research center named after him, the Saul Kripke Center. My philosophical development has benefitted incredibly from attending Kripke's seminars and having the invaluable opportunity of discussing my ideas with him. I hope this will continue next year throughout the process of writing my dissertation).

Thus, an important part of my project is dedicated to elucidating and defending a picture of

modal metaphysics centered on the notion of essence. Specifically, I take metaphysical modality to be *de re* and *grounded in the nature of the actual world*. This means, on the one hand, that things have a modal profile that is independent of the way we describe or think of them; and on the other hand, that such a modal profile is constitutively determined by the very nature or identity of things. These are two sides of the same coin: the source of metaphysical necessity and possibility is the factual makeup of the world. In fact, I argue for the thesis, which I call of the *priority of the actual world*, that the conditions for metaphysical *possibility* are constrained by the *nature of the actual world*. This includes both the fundamental properties of the things surrounding us, and the laws involving such properties. Those set the parameters, so to say, for metaphysical modality, while remaining stable through modal variation. Correspondingly, metaphysical *necessity* is grounded in the interaction of fundamental properties and natural laws.

A corollary of the *priority* thesis is that there is a range of *genuine* metaphysical possibilities, whose content is governed by the *nature of things at the actual world*. Again following Kripke, I hold that there is a sharp boundary between *metaphysical* possibility and *epistemic* possibility. What is metaphysically possible constitutively depends on the particular factual makeup of our world, i.e., on its properties, kinds, and laws; whereas no such constraint applies to epistemic possibility. Epistemic possibility rather captures *a priori* hypotheses open to a subject given certain linguistic and logical assumptions and rational capacities. In this sense my account is a *modal dualism*, holding that these two sorts of modality are *qualitatively* different. Crucially, for the dualist what is epistemically possible may be metaphysically *impossible*. Recent challenges coming from so-called *epistemic two-dimensionalism* (e.g. Chalmers: 2002) do not manage to undermine this distinction and Kripke's modal metaphysics. (I discuss these issues in chapter 2.)

The *priority* thesis has straightforward *epistemic* consequences, which are the central concern of my project. The main idea is simple: if the way things are at the actual world

constrains the way things are possibly and necessarily, then we can *learn* about the non-actual starting from our knowledge of the actual. By experiencing and investigating the things around us we gain access to what we *cannot* experience and investigate, i.e., the non-actual. This answers the *central question* for modal epistemology. The picture I propose requires that modal inquiry *starts as an empirical investigation* into the nature of the things of our world. By providing us with information concerning the fundamental properties, kinds, and structures of reality, the natural sciences (like physics, chemistry, and biology) at the same time also provide us with *modal* information. Scientific inquiry secures metaphysical modality with a firm, reliable basis; we *discover* metaphysical possibilities and necessities.

Specifically, I hold that we should understand modal metaphysics in terms of the *metaphysics of essence* and endorse certain essentialist theses. Thus, not only does my account endorse Kripke's essentialist principles (necessity of origin, of composition, and of fundamental kind); it also further endorses Fine's (1994) thesis that *metaphysical necessity is grounded in essence*. In fact, I hold that Kripke's modal metaphysics naturally leads to an underlying metaphysics of essence, and Fine's view gives us a nice insight into how that may work. Indeed, metaphysicians committed to essences are often challenged to say *more* about what essences *exactly* are and how we know them. I aim to address these challenges. I defend the thesis that there is a *further crucial feature* of essential properties, which gives us a better insight into what those properties are and what distinguishes them from other properties. This feature is *explanatory power*. Here I follow the work of Devitt in philosophy of biology, and argue that essential properties of individuals and kinds crucially *explain many relevant other properties* of those individuals and kinds. This is especially clear in the case of individuals like living organisms and properties like individuals' biological origin; but I hold that the point generalizes. Interesting cases range from physics and chemistry to, arguably, logic, geometry, and other *a*

priori areas of knowledge. Importantly, at the epistemological level, essential properties thus understood are the object of *scientific investigation*: far from being mysterious or inaccessible entities, as critics have argued, those properties are rather open to our empirical discovery.

On the other hand, I also argue that the relationship between essential properties and metaphysical necessity is governed by a basic *a priori bridge-principle*, which I call '(E)':

$$(E) \quad \mathbf{Ex} \rightarrow \Box \mathbf{Ex}$$

Principle (E) reads as follow: 'If a certain individual/kind/category x has an essential explanatory property or set of such properties E , then necessarily x /all instances of x have E '.

The principle holds at the *metaphysical-constitutive* level—because it clarifies the relationship of dependence between essence and necessity. But it also holds at the *epistemological-normative* level—because it shows how correct modal inference to metaphysical necessity goes.

Indeed, Kripke himself, in the context of his discussion of the necessary *a posteriori*, sketched a similar principle: 'If P , then necessarily P ' (1980). However, Kripke's formulation was strictly meant to clarify certain cases of modal inference (those involving an empirical premise), and operated primarily at the level of modal *knowledge*. Principle (E), on the other hand, proposes to further clarify the underlying modal *metaphysics* and the relevant notion of *essence*. Principle (E) improves on Kripke's original principle in two ways. First, by explicitly embedding an essential property or set of essential properties, (E) specifies a *general requirement* for metaphysical necessities, i.e., that they are all grounded in essential properties. The particular empirical premises which P stands for in Kripke's principle arguably all involve some or other essential property; but Kripke did not explicitly state any such requirement (P simply stood for some premise that we know to be true via empirical observation.) Most importantly, Kripke's principle did not postulate any constitutive dependence relation between metaphysical necessity and essential properties of the kind (E) expresses. Instead, (E) clarifies

that essential properties are that in virtue of which those necessities are *true*. Essences are the *source* of metaphysical necessity. Thus, principle (E) specifies the *metaphysical content* of the particular empirical premises that feature in modal inference; thereby it elucidates the underlying modal metaphysics.

Second, principle (E) clarifies *why* certain properties give rise to the corresponding metaphysical necessities and *how we know* such properties. For (E) appeals to the explanatory power essential properties have in the economy of the features of a certain individual/kind. Such explanatory power gives us a secure criterion to *recognize* such properties. Identifying such properties, and the laws governing them, is arguably at what scientific practice aims; essential properties, laws, and the sorts of explanations they disclose are the object of scientific investigation. The epistemology of metaphysical modality turns on the *epistemology of essence*.

Finally, principle (E) is *a priori*. The principle *cannot be justified empirically*. By governing metaphysical necessity, the principle ranges over the realm of the *non-actual*, which we *cannot experience* and have empirical evidence for. Yet, this should not throw us into deep modal skepticism. The epistemology of other important areas of knowledge, e.g. logic and mathematics, similarly requires that we resort to some form of *a priori* justification. Moreover, (E) comes with a *positive* explanation of its apriority. As I hold, the principle is justified *by the very nature of the concepts involved*. Once we are equipped with the right notions of *essential property* and *explanation*, it is easy to see that the principle has *a priori* metaphysical force. There is an *a priori constitutive relationship* between the concept of the *nature* or *identity* of an individual/kind on the one hand and the concept of being an *explanatory property* for that individual/kind on the other hand. Such relationship is what guarantees that the essential properties of a certain individual/kind are preserved across modal variation. i.e., that they are necessary. Thus, the notions of *essence*, *explanation*, *identity* and *necessity* are indeed *a priori*

tied to each other and interdependent. Principle (E) constitutes the *a priori* foundation of the *metaphysics of essence*. At the same time, by guiding modal inference, it also constitutes the *a priori* foundation of *metaphysical modal knowledge*.

In sum: the combination of essential properties and the basic bridge-principle (E) ground and elucidate metaphysical modality. Accordingly, metaphysical modal knowledge is the product of our knowledge of premises involving essential properties, together with the inferential principle (E). We discover (most) essential properties *a posteriori*, via scientific investigation; while we infer from principle (E) *a priori*. Both empirical and *a priori* factors are required for metaphysical modal knowledge.

I have divided my dissertation into three chapters, plus an Introduction and a Conclusion. At this stage, I have written most of chapter 1 and I have a complete draft of chapter 2. I presented chapter 2 to several international conferences both in the US and in Europe in the past year, and I am currently working on revisions to publish it before I go on the job market. My plan is to have a final draft of both chapter 1 and 2 by the end of September 2017. Chapter 3, which contains my positive proposal and contribution to the debate, is going to be based on a paper which I also presented in an international conference in London in June 2016. I plan to have a final draft of chapter 3 by the beginning of the Spring semester 2018. I will then dedicate the following two months to writing the Introduction, Conclusion, and Bibliography, and to making all the relevant revisions. I plan to be ready to defend and go on the job market on October 2018.

Selected Bibliography

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Antonella Mallozzi, *Curriculum Vitae*

Specialization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Modality, The A Priori

Competence: Ancient Philosophy, History of Analytic Philosophy

Education:

- December 2016 **The Graduate Center – CUNY, New York**
PhD: Philosophy (6th year)
Title of Dissertation: “*Toward A Kripkean Epistemology of Metaphysical Modality*”
Dissertation Committee: David Papineau (supervisor), Michael Devitt, Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers)
- July 2010 **Sapienza University of Rome, Rome (ITALY)**
Laurea Specialistica (MA equivalent): Philosophy, magna cum laude
Concentration: Epistemology
Thesis: *A Priori Knowledge: A Contemporary Debate* (written in English)
Supervisor: Tito Magri
- November 2007 **Sapienza University of Rome, Rome (ITALY)**
Laurea Triennale (BA equivalent): Philosophy, magna cum laude
Concentration: History of Philosophy

Articles:

1. “How the Golden Triangle Turned into an Inconsistent Triad. A Kripkean Response to Chalmers’s Modal Rationalism” (ms).
2. “The *A Priori* Route from Essence to Necessity” (ms.)
3. “Imagining Shades of Red. Williamson on the *A Priori-A Posteriori* distinction” (ms).

Talks:

1. “Conceivability, Possibility, and The Inconsistent Triad”, *Modal Metaphysics – Issues on the (Im)Possible IV*, Bratislava (SLOVAKIA), August 30th-31st 2016.
2. Comments on Jakob Schieder's "Explaining Essence and Modality", *Modal Metaphysics – Issues on the (Im)Possible IV*, Bratislava (SLOVAKIA), August 30th-31st 2016.
3. “Conceivability, Possibility, and The Inconsistent Triad”, *GEM – Ground, Essence, and Modality International Conference*, University of Helsinki (FINLAND), June 8th-10th 2016.
4. “The *A Priori* Route from Essence to Necessity”, *2016 Edgington Lectures* (keynote Kit Fine), Birkbeck College, University of London, London (UK), June 3rd-4th 2016.
5. “Perceptual Intuition and *A Priori* Justification”, *2016 UConn Graduate Conference on the A Priori* (keynote Elijah Chudnoff), University of Connecticut, February 20th 2016.
6. “Conceiving & Necessity. The Kripkean Challenge to Chalmers’s Modal Epistemology”, *2015 PLM Masterclass* (keynote David Chalmers), Stockholm University, Stockholm (SWEDEN), June 7th 2015.
7. “A Kripkean Look at Chalmers’s Modal Epistemology”, invited presentation at the Metaphysics & Logic Workshop (directed by Graham Priest), CUNY - The Graduate Center, May 14th 2015.
8. “Scrutability and Negative Facts”, invited presentation at the COGITO Research Center, Bologna (ITALY), May 29th 2013.

Academic Transcript

Jan 13, 2017 03:35 pm

 This is not an official transcript. Courses which are in progress may also be included on this transcript.

[Transfer Credit](#) [Institution Credit](#) [Transcript Totals](#) [Courses in Progress](#)

Transcript Data

STUDENT INFORMATION

Name : Antonella Mallozzi
Student Type: Doctoral Matriculant

Curriculum Information

Current Program

This is NOT an Official Transcript

DEGREES AWARDED

Sought: Doctor of Philosophy **Degree Date:**

Curriculum Information

Primary Degree

Major: Philosophy

Awarded: Master of Philosophy **Degree Date:** Feb 01, 2015

Curriculum Information

Primary Degree

Major: Philosophy

TRANSFER CREDIT ACCEPTED BY INSTITUTION [-Top-](#)

 Uni Rome La Sapienza

Subject	Course	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	R
GRCR	00000	Graduate Credentials	CR	20.000		0.00

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA Points
Current Term:	0.000	0.000	20.000	0.000	0.00	0.00

Unofficial Transcript

INSTITUTION CREDIT [-Top-](#)

Term: Fall 2011

Major: Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates
PHIL	77200	Graduate Center	GS	Topics in Philo of Semantics	A-	4.000	14.80	
PHIL	78700	Graduate Center	GS	Quine/Sellars on Thght & Lang	A	4.000	16.00	
PHIL	80200	Graduate Center	GS	Proseminar	P	4.000	0.00	

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA Points
Current Term:	12.000	12.000	12.000	8.000	30.80	3.85
Cumulative:	12.000	12.000	12.000	8.000	30.80	3.85

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Spring 2012

Major: Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates
PHIL	77600	Graduate Center	GS	Interp Pract:Art/Language/Law	A-	4.000	14.80	
PHIL	77700	Graduate Center	GS	Morality and the Self	A-	4.000	14.80	

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA Points
Current Term:	8.000	8.000	8.000	8.000	29.60	3.70
Cumulative:	20.000	20.000	20.000	16.000	60.40	3.77

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Fall 2012**Major:** Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates	R
PHIL	77000	Graduate Center	GS	Issues in Metaphysics	A-	4.000	14.80		

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Current Term:	4.000	4.000	4.000	4.000	14.80	3.70
Cumulative:	24.000	24.000	24.000	20.000	75.20	3.76

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Spring 2013**Major:** Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates	R
PHIL	76700	Graduate Center	GS	Non-Classical Logic	A-	4.000	14.80		

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Current Term:	4.000	4.000	4.000	4.000	14.80	3.70
Cumulative:	28.000	28.000	28.000	24.000	90.00	3.75

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Fall 2013**Major:** Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates	R
PHIL	76000	Graduate Center	GS	Plato and the Arts	A-	4.000	14.80		
PHIL	76600	Graduate Center	GS	Modal Logic	A	4.000	16.00		

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Current Term:	8.000	8.000	8.000	8.000	30.80	3.85
Cumulative:	36.000	36.000	36.000	32.000	120.80	3.77

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Spring 2014

Major: Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates
PHIL	77300	Graduate Center	GS	Psychlgcl Reality of Language	A	4.000	16.00	

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Current Term:	4.000	4.000	4.000	4.000	16.00	4.00
Cumulative:	40.000	40.000	40.000	36.000	136.80	3.80

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Fall 2014

Major: Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates
PHIL	90000	Graduate Center	GS	Dissertation Supervision	SP	1.000	0.00	

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Current Term:	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.00	0.00
Cumulative:	41.000	41.000	41.000	36.000	136.80	3.80

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Spring 2015

Major: Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates
PHIL	90000	Graduate Center	GS	Dissertation Supervision	SP	1.000	0.00	

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Current Term:	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.00	0.00
Cumulative:	42.000	42.000	42.000	36.000	136.80	3.80

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Fall 2015

Major: Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates
PHIL	90000	Graduate Center	GS	Dissertation Supervision	NGR	1.000	0.00	

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Current Term:	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0.00
Cumulative:	43.000	42.000	42.000	36.000	136.80	3.80

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Spring 2016

Major: Philosophy

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Grade	Credit Hours	Quality Points	Start and End Dates
PHIL	90000	Graduate Center	GS	Dissertation Supervision	NGR	1.000	0.00	

Term Totals (Graduate School)

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Current Term:	1.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0.00

Cumulative:

44.000 42.000 42.000 36.000 136.80 3.80

Unofficial Transcript

TRANSCRIPT TOTALS (GRADUATE SCHOOL) -Top-

Events: Passed First Exam **Decision:** 02/11/2014

Events: Passed Second Exam **Decision:** 09/17/2014

Events: Advanced to Candidacy **Decision:** 09/17/2014

	Attempt Hours	Passed Hours	Earned Hours	GPA Hours	Quality Points	GPA
Total Institution:	44.000	42.000	42.000	36.000	136.80	3.80
Total Transfer:	0.000	0.000	20.000	0.000	0.00	0.00
Overall:	44.000	42.000	62.000	36.000	136.80	3.80

Unofficial Transcript

COURSES IN PROGRESS -Top-

Term: Fall 2016

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Credit Hours	Start and End Dates
PHIL	90000	Graduate Center	GS	Dissertation Supervision	1.000	

Unofficial Transcript

Term: Spring 2017

Subject	Course	Campus	Level	Title	Credit Hours	Start and End Dates
PHIL	90000	Graduate Center	GS	Dissertation Supervision	1.000	

Unofficial Transcript

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RELEASE: 8.4.1